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An important note for the reader 
 
 
Land Transport New Zealand is a Crown entity established under the Land Transport 
New Zealand Amendment Act 2004. The objective of Land Transport New Zealand is to 
allocate resources in a way that contributes to an integrated, safe, responsive and 
sustainable land transport system. Each year, Land Transport New Zealand invests a 
portion of its funds on research that contributes to this objective. 
 
The research detailed in this report was commissioned by Land Transport New Zealand. 
 
While this report is believed to be correct at the time of its preparation, Land Transport 
New Zealand, and its employees and agents involved in its preparation and publication, 
cannot accept any liability for its contents or for any consequences arising from its use. 
People using the contents of the document, whether directly or indirectly, should apply 
and rely on their own skill and judgement. They should not rely on its contents in 
isolation from other sources of advice and information. If necessary, they should seek 
appropriate legal or other expert advice in relation to their own circumstances, and to 
the use of this report.  
 
The material contained in this report is the output of research and should not be 
construed in any way as policy adopted by Land Transport New Zealand but may be 
used in the formulation of future policy. 
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Executive summary 
This report summarises research undertaken in New Zealand during 2006–07 to 
investigate how intelligent transport system (ITS) measures can be used to improve the 
transport network efficiency during traffic incidents. It was intended to be a scoping study 
only, to identify the key issues and the need for further investigation. 
 
The overall aim of this long-term research was to: 
• investigate the ability of ITS treatments such as adaptive signal control (eg, the 
Sydney Coordinated Adaptive Traffic System (SCATS)) and variable message signs 
(VMS) to detect and respond to serious traffic incidents 
• determine the most appropriate traffic management strategies (in terms of overall 
network reliability) to apply when such incidents are detected. 
 
The scoping study involved: 
1. A literature review of techniques and software/systems currently used in New Zealand 
and elsewhere in the world to manage traffic congestion and respond to incidents 
2. An exploratory study modelling incident detection and response in a New Zealand 
urban network (Auckland North Shore) using microsimulation. 
 
The literature review found that: 
• considerable research has been done in the areas of incident detection and 
management, ITS methods such as adaptive signal control (eg, SCATS) and network 
reliability measures. However, little work has been done to bring all three research 
areas together 
• while automated incident detection techniques on traffic networks have become 
increasingly sophisticated, in practice there is still limited use (and trust) of them. 
However, there has been some success in using simple detection systems to monitor 
and treat isolated problems such as intersection approach queues 
• motorway incident detection is often relatively well established, but there has been 
less attention on incident monitoring of arterial road networks. This is despite the fact 
that such incidents regularly affect the adjacent motorway networks and vice versa 
• there is a lack of robust incident detection available at present in New Zealand. The 
Auckland Traffic Management Unit is expanding its data collection in order to improve 
its response to the traffic conditions and respond to incidents 
• there is a lot of variability in the effectiveness of using driver information systems 
such as VMS to redirect road users away from incidents. However, it is possible to 
‘learn’ the effectiveness of such treatments in a particular location using an expert 
system and cumulative treatment/effect data 
Executive summary 
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• while overall network travel time is still a strong measure of network performance 
during incidents, other measures such as variability of travel times and time to 
recovery may be just as important for motorists and other parties 
• SCATS was not originally developed as an incident management system and has a 
relatively limited ability to detect and treat significant incidents. However, its 
predominance here in New Zealand means that it has an important role to play in any 
such system 
• modelling dynamically adaptive signal control systems using microsimulation enables 
a more realistic response to be produced (compared with fixed-time signal systems) 
when testing the effects of incidents on the network 
• although microsimulation is a good tool for evaluating incident management 
strategies, using a model calibrated under ‘normal’ operating conditions may not be 
sufficient to properly test incident scenarios. It may be necessary to calibrate 
microsimulation models using data from real incident conditions (where driver 
behaviour may be different than under normal conditions). 
 
The exploratory microsimulation modelling study found that: 
• SCATS can be modified by an operator in anticipation of additional demand due to 
diversions resulting from an incident to reduce the delay to the diverted traffic 
• SCATS can be modified by an operator at the time of the incident in anticipation of 
the change in demand from an incident 
• although SCATS will respond to the change in demand caused by traffic diversions 
due to incidents, an immediate and targeted intervention will produce better results 
• the benefits of incident management interventions such as SCATS adjustment may be 
limited to particular journey paths. Microsimulation modelling can help to identify on 
which routes efforts should be concentrated. 
 
Both the literature review and the preliminary modelling highlighted the need for more 
work to be undertaken in this area in New Zealand. The following are recommended for 
further investigation or action. 
• Future modelling should build on this study by expanding the range of incident 
scenarios tested and treatment options applied. 
• Consideration should be given to further expansion of the existing modelled network 
to include a wider range of alternative detour routes and to capture the impact of 
incidents over a wider network area. 
• Field data should be collected to investigate how motorists respond during incidents 
and to confirm the accuracy of the simulation model findings under incident 
conditions. Suitable data could include:  
- SCATS traffic count/occupancy and signal phasing data 
- closed-circuit television (CCTV) images (queue lengths) 
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- detector loop data (speed, occupancy); either existing installations or one-off 
- floating-car or number-plate data (travel times) 
- a survey of route choice during incidents, including drivers’ response to VMS and 
other information regarding incidents. 
• More widespread and robust means of incident detection should be considered in 
major New Zealand urban areas, on both motorway and arterial road networks. This 
includes more frequent mid-block detector loops (or alternative technology), 
expanded CCTV coverage and automated incident detection systems. 
• The impact of different response times to the overall performance and recovery of the 
network during and after an incident should be investigated further. 
• Further investigation is recommended into how drivers behave during incidents, 
particularly when provided with additional route information via VMS, radio reports, 
etc. 
• Further investigation should be made into the ability of SCATS and other software 
tools to detect incidents automatically and to provide suitable guidance on appropriate 
treatment strategies. If necessary, develop improved capability for the tools to do 
these tasks. 
• Investigation should be carried out into the ability of microsimulation to be linked 
directly to a live traffic situation, to enable ‘on-the-fly’ incident assessment, modelling 
and resolution. 
• Monitoring should continue of ITS literature and practice worldwide for any newer 
technologies or congestion management treatments that may emerge and be 
applicable to the New Zealand context. 
 
The Effectiveness of Incident Management on Network Reliability 
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Abstract 
This report summarises preliminary research undertaken in New Zealand 
during 2006–07 to investigate the ability of intelligent transport system (ITS) 
treatments, such as adaptive signal control (eg, SCATS) and variable 
message signs (VMS), to detect and respond to serious traffic incidents, and 
to determine the most appropriate traffic management strategies (in terms of 
overall network reliability) to apply when such incidents are detected. The 
study involved a literature review of techniques and software/systems 
currently used to manage traffic congestion and respond to incidents, and an 
exploratory microsimulation study modelling incident detection and response 
in an urban network. 
 
The research found few attempts to bring together research in the three 
areas of incident detection/management, ITS methods such as adaptive 
signal control, and network reliability measures. There is also a lack of robust 
incident detection available at present in New Zealand. Preliminary modelling 
found that SCATS can be modified to better meet additional demand due to 
diversions after an incident, and modelling can help to identify which 
particular journey paths benefit most from such incident management 
interventions. The findings highlighted the need for more work to be 
undertaken in this area in New Zealand. 
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1. Introduction 
This report summarises research undertaken in New Zealand during 2006–07 to 
investigate how intelligent transport systems (ITS) measures can be used to improve the 
transport network efficiency during traffic incidents. It was intended to be a scoping study 
only, to identify the key issues and the need for further investigation. 
1.1 Purpose of the proposed research 
As congestion on New Zealand roads increases, the network has less spare capacity for 
use during incidents. It is imperative that such capacity is used optimally. 
 
The overall aim of this research in the long term was to: 
• investigate the ability of ITS, such as adaptive signal control (eg Sydney Coordinated 
Adaptive Traffic System) (SCATS)) and variable message signs (VMS), to detect and 
respond to serious traffic incidents 
• determine the most appropriate traffic management strategies (in terms of measures 
to be identified for overall network reliability) to apply when such incidents are 
detected. 
1.2 Research tasks 
The proposed research in this study involved: 
1. a literature review of techniques and software/systems currently used in New Zealand 
and elsewhere in the world to manage traffic congestion and respond to incidents. 
2. an exploratory study modelling incident detection and response in a New Zealand 
urban network using microsimulation. 
 
The resulting findings enabled us to determine whether there was a need for more 
detailed investigation in this area. 
 
The following sections detail the work undertaken. Following a review of the literature 
(section 2), a desired methodology for modelling was developed (section 3), and 
preliminary modelling undertaken (section 4). Conclusions and recommendations for 
further research follow (sections 5 and 6). 
 
 
2.  Background literature 
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2. Background literature 
A literature review was undertaken of techniques and software/systems currently used in 
New Zealand and elsewhere in the world to manage traffic congestion and respond to 
incidents. The aim was to examine what was currently being done within New Zealand to 
identify and manage incidents in congested networks and monitor the effectiveness of 
these strategies. This would assist in identifying the key problems for practitioners 
requiring resolution. It also aimed to determine the extent to which these issues had been 
investigated elsewhere in the world and whether any techniques/systems developed could 
be applied here in New Zealand. 
2.1 Context 
There is growing interest in non-infrastructure solutions for handling the effects of traffic 
congestion – by using intelligent transport systems (ITS) to monitor traffic conditions, 
detect any incidents, and implement appropriate remedies such as changed traffic signal 
plans or driver information signage. These techniques provide a cost-effective way to 
make better use of the existing road infrastructure, rather than simply providing 
additional road capacity. Overseas evidence to date has identified good benefits to both 
motorists and transport agencies (James 2006). 
 
Car ownership levels are increasing and traffic congestion continues to grow in major 
urban centres in New Zealand. There is an increased awareness of the environmental 
effects of congestion and mitigation measures are needed. In order to address these 
trends, the efficiency of the existing transport network needs to be maximised. ITS 
applications in New Zealand are currently limited, but likely to become more important in 
the future.  
 
Dynamic traffic signal control systems (eg, SCATS, developed by the New South Wales 
Roads and Traffic Authority) are used in every major city in New Zealand to optimise the 
timing of individual signalised intersections for the benefit of the network as a whole. 
While this is an effective method for handling the normal gradual changes in traffic flows 
within a network over time, it is not clear whether it can always respond optimally by 
default when a major traffic incident (eg, accident or blockage) or abnormal traffic 
demand (eg, travel to/from a major sports or cultural event) affects the network 
(particularly at peak congestion times). It may be that, in attempting to ‘fix’ a blockage, 
the flow-on effects to the rest of the network result in a worse overall network 
performance than from doing nothing. 
 
Pre-determined incident management plans may be a way to improve the default 
handling of such situations; these would (for example) identify key alternative routes, 
provide signal priority along these corridors, and possibly provide driver guidance using 
dynamic signage and in-vehicle navigation systems. There is, therefore, a need to 
determine how effective they are and how they can be automatically implemented. 
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Traffic modelling provides a means to test these scenarios in an efficient manner without 
affecting real road users. Microsimulation is a form of traffic modelling whereby individual 
vehicles are simulated within the defined road network and driver decisions are made 
dynamically in response to conditions encountered throughout the network. Luk and Tay 
(2006) note that microsimulation models are particularly useful for ‘complex, congested 
situations that are normally beyond the domain of analysis using conventional analytical 
or macroscopic modelling procedures’.  
 
It should be noted that, like all traffic models, the usefulness of microsimulation is 
somewhat related to the ability to accurately model driver route-choice behaviour, 
especially where drivers do not have the capacity to receive and respond to information 
on congestion ahead on their (pre-incident) perceived optimal route. 
 
There has been increasing interest worldwide into assessing various measures for 
mitigating the effects of traffic incidents. In the United Kingdom for example, the 
Department for Transport’s Urban Traffic Management and Control programme is a long-
term research and implementation effort to test new techniques for using ITS to manage 
urban areas (DfT 2006). One project of the programme (Gale and Spiers 2001) 
investigated the use of microsimulation modelling to determine the best choice of 
management plan following an incident on Birmingham’s motorway network. It was, 
however, limited in its use of a fixed-time (non-dynamic) signal control system.  
 
Similar applications of incident modelling using microsimulation have also been 
investigated in Australia (eg, Stazic et al 2004, Dia and Cottman 2004). Microsimulation 
of a SCATS-controlled traffic signal network to assess its performance has also been 
studied (Millar et al 2004, Zhang and Taylor 2006), but little research has investigated the 
combination of SCATS control and incident management. 
 
The implications of transport network reliability have also been a field of growing interest, 
both internationally and in New Zealand (eg, Nicholson and Dantas 2004). Various studies 
have been undertaken to identify possible incident mitigation strategies and to determine 
how to objectively measure the network impacts of an incident. 
2.2 Congestion 
Congestion is becoming an increasingly large problem in New Zealand. Growth in major 
urban centres and an increase in car ownership levels have contributed to increased 
congestion. Auckland is the fastest growing region in New Zealand with 90% of New 
Zealand’s population growth occurring in Auckland (ARC 2006). The cost of congestion on 
Auckland’s motorways and state highways is estimated to be one billion dollars a year 
(Transit NZ 2006a). In Auckland, car ownership levels are quite high and have been 
increasing at about twice the rate of population growth in the region (ARC 2006).  
2.  Background literature 
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Traffic congestion can be divided into two different types: 
1. ‘Recurring’ congestion occurs when there is regularly not enough capacity in the 
transportation system to meet the demand, for example during peak-hour periods of 
the day.   
2. ‘Non-recurring’ congestion is caused by a temporary and unexpected reduction in 
capacity due to incidents such as crashes, spills or weather; or a similarly unexpected 
temporary increase in ‘typical’ demand levels generated by unique, unusual or 
infrequent events such as sporting events, festivals, retail openings or sales. 
 
It has been estimated that incidents (ie, non-recurring congestion) are responsible for 
half of the congestion on United States freeways (USDoT 2000). 
 
Adding capacity to the transportation network, by building additional roadways or lanes, is 
often proposed as the main long-term means to resolve recurring congestion. Such 
treatments may also minimise the effects of non-recurring congestion. However, it is not 
necessarily the most appropriate solution to manage congestion, given the large cost 
often involved and the potential for induced traffic to negate any gains made. 
 
A potentially cost-effective treatment of urban congestion is to increase the efficiency of 
the existing road network using ITS. Such solutions can ensure that the full capacity of 
the transportation system is used more often, generally at lower cost. However, there 
may still be the potential for such efficiencies to induce further traffic on the network. 
2.3 Incidents 
There are many different events that affect the normal or desired operation of the road 
network. Scottish Executive (2003) identifies the following events that can cause 
temporary reductions in road network capacity (relative to the demand): 
• vehicle-based incidents, ranging from minor vehicle breakdowns to multiple injury 
accidents 
• debris/obstructions on the road network 
• maintenance activities 
• recurrent congestion 
• any combination of the above. 
 
Another possibility is extreme weather events, such as heavy rain or hailstorms. For the 
purposes of this research, all of these could be considered ‘incidents’. However, planned 
events (eg, maintenance, sports/cultural activities) or repeating events (eg, peak-period 
congestion) may be of less interest when they occur alone, because of the ability to plan 
ahead for them. 
 
Many unplanned incidents of note tend to occur during peak periods when the network is 
already operating at or near capacity and any disruption in the traffic flow can have a 
significant effect (a similar incident in off-peak times may be easily absorbed by the 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ON NETWORK RELIABILITY  
14 
available capacity). Incidents can, therefore, cause large variations in transportation 
network reliability. Cambridge Systematics (2005) cited examples of United States road 
corridors where the 95th percentile travel times were 50% higher than mean travel times 
in the pm peak period; yet for the same corridors earlier in the afternoon the 95th 
percentile was only 15–20% higher than the mean. 
 
2.3.1 Incident management 
Successful management of incidents on road networks requires two key elements: 
1. Efficiently detecting incidents (including identifying their location and nature), 
preferably by automated means 
2. Suitable options for treating incidents, both in terms of removing or fixing the entity 
that caused the incident (if possible) and managing vehicle flows during and after the 
incident. 
 
Methods for incident detection could include, for example, calls from public (call boxes, 
cell phones), Police, highway patrols and automated incident detection systems 
(discussed below). Incident verification is required to determine the precise location and 
nature of the incident and is important to prevent responding to false alarms. Verification 
can be performed by on-site personnel, closed-circuit television (CCTV), or multiple 
incoming calls. The response to the incident will depend on the type of incident and any 
incident management plan that may be available to put in place. 
 
2.3.2 Automated incident detection 
Automated incident detection (AID) uses real-time traffic data and specific algorithms to 
identify incidents. Typically, a system will require some arrangement of traffic detectors 
spread around the road network (eg, inductive in-ground loops or overhead microwave 
detectors) connected to a central traffic monitoring centre where software can analyse the 
data and relay relevant information to human operators. Usually such monitoring systems 
also include a series of CCTV video cameras placed around the network and linked to the 
control centre to provide additional visual information for the operators. 
 
Reductions in observed vehicle speeds are often used to trigger incident alarms. A good 
AID algorithm will have a low false alarm rate, a high detection rate and a fast time to 
detect the incident. However, a reduction in speed on the monitored network is not 
necessarily indicative of an incident and incidents tend to occur when the network is 
already heavily congested during the peak periods. This makes it difficult to detect 
incidents using simple algorithms. 
 
Scottish Executive (2003) proposed two event monitoring processes to detect traffic 
events, using automated traffic counter sites: 
1. The ‘network operator’ process compares the current speed (an average of a user-
defined number of vehicles) to the historic average speed (over a user-defined 
number of days) for the current day of the week. When the speed drops below a user-
2.  Background literature 
15 
defined percentage (eg, 50%) of this average an alarm is raised and the traffic 
counter carries out an action such as informing the traffic monitoring centre or 
switching on a VMS. This process is useful in identifying deviations from the expected 
traffic delays for a particular situation. 
2. The ‘public’ process allows a user to specify boundary events (eg, speed values that, 
when breached, cause an alarm to be raised). These boundaries could be based on a 
proportion of the prevailing speed limit (eg, 50%). This process is useful for 
identifying departures from the optimal (or acceptable) traffic flow situation; however, 
such departures may be quite common during peak periods. 
 
While the former process is useful for network operators to be able to identify and 
respond to unexpected incidents, information from the latter process could be 
disseminated to the public (eg, via a map-based website) to show (in real time) areas of 
the arterial road network that were suffering delay. The latter would act as an informative 
pre-trip communication medium and form the basis for trip planning, whereas the former 
would enable network operators to assist travellers once on their way. 
 
Williams and Guin (2007) provide a useful summary of the various algorithms devised over 
the years to detect incidents on traffic networks, the first going back to the 1970s (eg, 
Payne 1975). While early algorithms were largely based on simple speed or occupancy 
comparisons and classical traffic flow theory, more recently complex techniques have been 
tried such as neural networks (eg, Srinivasan et al 2004), fuzzy logic (eg, Yaguang and 
Anke 2006) and wavelet transformations (eg, Samant and Adeli 2000). 
 
Incident detection algorithms for high-speed freeways are well established; however, on 
lower-speed urban arterials the problem is more complex (due to the greater density of 
intersections and other interruptions, and lower initial traffic speeds) and less researched. 
A methodology for arterial incident detection has been investigated (Zhang and Taylor 
2006). This was done by researching lane-blocking incidents (including the entire link 
being blocked) between two adjacent intersections on an arterial network. Due to a lack 
of real incident data on the arterial network, incidents were modelled using Q-Paramics 
software. Additional detectors were required on the upstream link to monitor volume, 
occupancy and upstream turning volumes.   
 
Evans (2006) describes work that has been done on various state highway intersections 
in the Auckland region to address isolated congestion problems by signal intervention 
triggered by (inductive loop) queue detectors in strategic locations. Considerable success 
was achieved in addressing some localised problems with interventions such as: 
• using a queue detector approaching a Give Way controlled left-turn slip lane at a 
signalised intersection to modify the signal operation to provide some protection for 
the left turn when significant queues form 
• using a queue detector to locate queues on a low-priority approach to a roundabout 
or priority intersection to trigger traffic signals nearby that create gaps in the major 
flow and provide a measure of relief to the low-priority flow 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ON NETWORK RELIABILITY  
16 
• systems that detect queues downstream of a signalised intersection and trigger a 
switch from network-wide (master) signal control to an isolated fixed-time operation 
to better handle approach time sharing until the queues downstream disperse. 
 
The queue detection uses a standard 4.5 m long in-ground inductance loop with a 
2.5 second delay before being triggered by passing vehicles. This combination appeared 
to optimise realistic queue detection; free-flowing longer heavy vehicles could clear the 
loops easily within this time while the 2.5 s activation appeared to quickly identify queue 
build-up over the detection area. 
 
Other forms of detection technology are available, subject to practical considerations. For 
example, image processing of video to detect passing vehicles (eg, via the Autoscope 
series of products, developed by Image Sensing Systems Inc; and the Traficon video 
detection system, developed in Belgium) has been used in some locations (including 
previously Ngauranga Gorge in Wellington). Versavel (1999) claims that incident 
detection via Traficon video cameras has a higher and faster detection rate and fewer 
false alarms than loop-based algorithms. Wang et al (2005) notes that such systems have 
an advantage in not requiring in-road installation (which can be quite disruptive on busy 
roads), but the converse is that they generally require some overhead location (eg, 
gantries) and this can become more difficult to find if monitoring repeatedly along a 
motorway. 
 
Williams and Guin (2007) undertook a survey of AID use by traffic management centres 
(TMCs) across the United States. From 32 TMCs, they found a lot of concern with the level 
of performance with existing AID algorithms, with 81% stating that even if reliable and 
accurate AID algorithms were widely available in the future, they would not completely 
replace other methods (such as mobile phone calls or operator visual detection) but, 
rather, would serve as a complement to these. While 53% of the TMCs had an AID 
algorithm integrated into their system, less than half had the detection algorithm fully or 
partly functional, with others choosing to disable or ignore their AID. Coupled with the 
finding that 70% of respondents considered their current incident detection capabilities to 
be insufficient, this underscores the need for further AID algorithm research. 
 
2.3.3 Incident treatment 
The aim of most successful incident treatments should ideally be to return the road 
network to ‘normal’ operating conditions as quickly as possible. In some cases, a 
proposed treatment may attempt to prevent the incident from happening in the first place 
or mitigate its size or duration (eg, prevent it escalating to a major catastrophe). 
 
ITS solutions provide an important tool for treating incidents in an efficient and relatively 
low-cost manner. Some of the key elements are discussed below (not all of them are 
directly relevant to incident management, but may have an effect on the likelihood of 
incidents occurring in the first place). 
2.  Background literature 
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Advanced traffic management systems (ATMS) include:  
• real-time automatic incident detection, as discussed above in section 2.3.2 
• adaptive signal control, which dynamically adjusts the signal times available for each 
phase based on observed demands and network optimisation considerations 
• traffic signal pre-emption for public transport or emergency vehicles 
• dynamically varying speed limits 
• variable lane direction use (‘tidal flow’) or temporary shoulder use 
• ramp metering limiting access to motorway on-ramps 
• automatic tolling or road pricing, to discourage motor vehicle use. 
 
Advanced traveller information systems (ATIS) include:  
• dissemination of real-time traffic information in the form of radio traffic reports, traffic 
websites etc 
• variable message signs (VMS) to inform motorists of incidents, road conditions, 
congestion, road works, suggested detours etc 
• in-vehicle navigation systems, which provide drivers with continuous detailed 
information (using GPS location) on how to get to a desired destination. 
 
While VMS can be effective, if motorists have local knowledge they will often ignore the 
VMS suggested routing and select their own perceived optimal route. Motorists are often 
unwilling to change routes during an incident if they are unsure of the reliability of 
alternate routes. Traffic diversion rates for VMS routing can range from 5% to 80% with 
the most important factor affecting the decision to divert being network familiarity (Hidas 
2001). 
 
Recent local research on the use of ITS in New Zealand (James 2006) identified ‘adaptive 
signal control’ and ‘incident detection’ among the top four ITS treatments (out of 48) in 
terms of contributing to the objectives of the New Zealand Transport Strategy (MoT 2002). 
 
Although many ITS treatments such as adaptive traffic signals are able by default to 
handle changes in traffic due to incidents, pre-determined incident management plans 
may be a way to improve the default handling of such situations. Once a particular 
incident is detected, a specific plan to deal with it would be identified and implemented, 
either automatically or via human intervention. These plans would (for example): 
• identify key alternative routes to re-route traffic to (either existing traffic already 
affected by the incident or subsequent traffic approaching the affected area) 
• provide signal priority either along the incident-affected corridors or along the 
alternative routes 
• possibly provide driver guidance using dynamic signage and in-vehicle navigation 
systems to warn of the incident and suggest alternative routes. 
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Because of the unpredictable nature of many incidents, however, it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to identify a specific plan that exactly addresses each and every possible 
incident. Instead, common coping strategies may need to be identified and coupled with 
incident-specific traffic data to tailor a suitable solution. 
 
Expert systems are one potential tool to help assist in the incident treatment decision-
making process. Whyte (1997) explains how such a system has been used in Scotland to 
determine suitable VMS legends and strategies when an incident is detected. A simulation 
model is used to forecast two hours ahead the likely effects on the network due to the 
incident (to be of use, clearly this has to simulate at much faster than real-time speed). 
Using the results obtained from the traffic model, the system searches for the best 
guidance message to be displayed on the VMS. It assesses each sign upstream of the 
incident in isolation, checking that at least one origin-destination route, passing the VMS, 
complies with the following: 
• the origin-destination pair is classed as a main destination 
• its normal route will pass through the incident 
• its flow is greater than a minimum threshold 
• there is an alternative route available (journey time difference to be greater than a 
set threshold) 
• there is available capacity on the identified diversion route. 
 
At the end of this procedure, the best signing strategy is identified (based on minimising 
journey times) and the process is repeated every six minutes, taking account of the VMS 
obedience rates and traffic flows obtained from the last signing strategy implemented. 
Over time, the expert system learns what effect each legend has on the traffic diversion 
rates obtained. 
 
From preliminary testing of three scenarios, Whyte (1997) found that the expert system 
saved between 17–52% of the predicted additional vehicle-hours, compared with no VMS 
being implemented. 
2.4 Performance measures 
The effectiveness of an incident management plan is dependent on the response time to 
incidents and what response is actually applied. The impact the incident has on the traffic 
network is also dependent on the location, type and severity of the incident as well as the 
level of congestion on the network at the time of the incident. If the network is operating 
near capacity, any reduction in capacity caused by an incident can have a large impact on 
the network.  
 
Figure 2.1 below (adapted from FHWA 2000) illustrates how an incident typically affects 
vehicle delays. The normal traffic flow is constrained by the incident, thus causing delays 
and usually queuing. Once the incident has ended or been treated, the route will run at 
capacity for some time to dissipate the built-up traffic. How long this will take will depend 
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somewhat on whether the normal demand flow continues to arrive or some of the 
subsequent demand is diverted to other routes or times (determining this reduced 
demand is an interesting modelling exercise in its own right). 
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Figure 2.1 Delay caused by incidents (adapted from FHWA 2000). 
 
The network performance during an incident can be determined by looking at measures 
such as the: 
• change in vehicle travel times  
• amount of re-routing that takes place  
• level of service (volume/capacity ratios) at key locations of the network 
• time for the network to recover.   
 
Such measures can be assessed at both a network-wide and route-specific level. It may 
be that, in attempting to fix an incident locally, the flow-on effects to the rest of the 
network result in a worse overall network performance than from doing nothing. The 
performance of certain key routes or intersections may also be deemed more important 
and the performance measures at such locations may need to be weighted accordingly. 
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While overall network travel time is relatively straightforward to obtain from modelling, it 
may not be a sufficient measure. Variability of travel times is often viewed just as 
importantly as average times by motorists (Ensor 2004). 
 
The Austroads travel time performance programme is implemented by Transit New 
Zealand (Transit NZ) and local councils to monitor the performance of the transportation 
network in Auckland, Tauranga, Wellington and Christchurch (Brown et al 2006). Traffic 
congestion levels are measured using travel time data. A congestion indicator has been 
developed that is a function of the measured travel time versus free flow (uncongested) 
travel time. The highest congestion indicator on urban state highways in New Zealand 
currently occurs in Auckland during the pm peak period; Auckland also has the highest 
degree of travel time variability in New Zealand (also during the pm peak).  
 
Scottish Executive (2005) lists a number of network performance indicators (both at a 
nation-wide and a local route level) used to monitor congested arterial routes: 
• additional travel time per annum attributable to traffic congestion (ie, compared 
with the same trip made under free-flow speed conditions) 
• average time lost per vehicle kilometre (the above measure divided by the 
amount of traffic, averaged over the year) 
• cost of trunk road congestion per annum (based on the additional travel time and 
economic value-of-time figures) 
• journey time reliability (based on proportion of trips taking >115% of the average 
journey time for that same period) 
• congestion bands (where the average speed drop compared with free-flow speed is 
banded into ‘mild’, ‘serious’, and ‘severe’ categories) 
• annual average daily congestion index (the ratio of the free flow speed to the 
actual speed averaged over the whole day). 
 
How well these kinds of measures would first detect and then assess the performance of 
incident management treatments would depend somewhat on the level of existing 
congestion and the relative impact on this of incidents. If, for example, incidents could be 
absorbed largely within existing capacity, there might be some increase in additional 
travel time, but very little change in the amount of severe congestion or proportion of 
trips taking >115% of the average journey time. 
 
The application of the performance measures will affect the choice of metric used. For 
example, an evaluation of a proposed new network management treatment may require a 
cost-benefit analysis to justify funding; hence economic costs of incidents will be 
important. For day-to-day operational performance assessment, more immediate 
measures of overall travel time lost each day may be useful. Meanwhile, obtaining a 
suitable indicator of the perceived level of satisfaction by the general motoring public may 
require some kind of journey time reliability measure.  
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The choice of performance measures to use will also depend on what can be readily 
extracted from either the real-world detectors or (in the case of test modelling) the 
software package being used. For long-term operational monitoring of performance, the 
ongoing means to do this has to be cost-effective with a minimum of effort. 
 
The performance of the network from the point of view of the road user is another 
important perspective to consider, even if the perceived performance doesn’t always 
match the true performance by more objective measures. Scottish Executive (2001) 
noted that market research carried out for their national road monitoring system 
suggested that drivers favoured delay information (ie, that imposed by roadworks or an 
incident over any usual delay) more highly than overall journey time information. 
 
2.4.1 Network reliability 
Good incident management strategies can provide more reliability to the network in terms 
of travel time. This may be important from a road user perspective; Ensor (2004) found 
that Auckland motorists viewed the importance of travel time variability similarly to 
reducing average travel time. 
 
FHWA (2006) notes that while traffic congestion is often communicated only in terms of 
simple averages, most travellers experience their travel times varying greatly from day to 
day and remember those few bad days where they suffered unexpected delays. Figure 2.2 
illustrates this concept. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Average versus perceived congestion (from FHWA 2006). 
 
Commuters who travel on a route with significant travel time variability must plan for this 
variability if they want to arrive nearly always on time. Using the average travel time will 
not suffice; a time cushion or buffer must be allowed for. 
 
Such benefits of improved reliability may be quite noticeable when attempting to quantify 
the benefits of an incident management treatment. The improvement in average travel 
time may be rather modest; however, reliability measures may show a much greater 
improvement in reducing the worst few days of unexpected delay. Figure 2.3 
demonstrates a hypothetical example of this effect. 
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Figure 2.3 Effects on reliability of network improvement (from FHWA 2006). 
Taking these issues into consideration, it may be that additional measures of network 
reliability need to be determined, such as the 95th percentile travel time or the average 
‘buffer time’ (ie, the extra time that most travellers add to their average travel time when 
planning trips to try to ensure on-time arrival). 
2.5 Software 
Both operational (day-to-day) management and longer-term planning of incident 
detection and treatment is greatly assisted these days by various software tools to 
manage network flows (eg, by adjusting signal timings) and predict the likely effects of 
any changes made. The following discussion outlines some of the key tools available. 
 
2.5.1 SCATS 
Traditionally, traffic signals were operated on fixed-time cycles (during peak times at 
least), whereby a constant green time was repeatedly given to a particular phase. 
However, this failed to account for any variations in traffic flows, both normal and unusual 
variations. Similarly, such systems could not account for any wider network effects of 
changes to individual intersection timings. Nowadays, dynamic traffic signal control 
systems are used in every major city in New Zealand to optimise the timing of individual 
signalised intersections for the benefit of the network as a whole.  
 
SCATS was developed in the 1970s by the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) of New 
South Wales, Australia, as a traffic adaptive system to coordinate the traffic signals on 
Sydney’s main arterial routes. SCATS is now used extensively in Australia and New 
Zealand and is also used in Asia and North America. Nineteen local authorities in New 
Zealand use SCATS and 90% of all signals in New Zealand are under SCATS control 
(Sissons 2006). 
 
Traffic operation in SCATS is optimised by changing the green-time splits, offsets and 
cycle lengths (Lowrie 1982). Vehicle detectors on the intersection entries are used by a 
network of computers to determine the appropriate timings. The main computer runs the 
Central Monitoring System, which manages the regional computers, performs the 
collection of SCATS data, develops and generates the intersection personality data, and 
runs the analysis programs. The regional computers determine the overall strategy used 
by the local signal controllers at each intersection (see Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4 SCATS network computer control. 
 
RTA (1997) describes the optimisation process in more detail. The intersections in the 
SCATS-controlled network are divided into systems and subsystems. The cycle time, 
phasing, green splits and offsets are constantly monitored and adjusted at the subsystem 
level. Adjacent compatible subsystems can be linked to improve coordination. Vehicle 
detectors are located at the stop line at each intersection, ie, where vehicles enter the 
intersection or wait to go through. The average maximum flow rate is determined for each 
measured approach as a moving average of the daily maximums. Thus the saturation flow 
for each location is self-calibrating to reflect local conditions. The SCATS degree of 
saturation is defined as the ratio of green time used by vehicles (at the saturation flow 
rate) to the available green time. At the subsystem level, splits and cycle lengths are 
monitored and adjusted to obtain an appropriate equal degree of saturation for each 
phase to maximise network efficiency in terms of delay. 
 
The benefits of SCATS signal control versus fixed time and isolated vehicle actuated 
control are demonstrated in the literature. The results demonstrate significant traffic 
benefits can be obtained from SCATS. As traffic demand increases, the benefits of SCATS 
control also increase, in terms of reduced delay and stops, compared with fixed and 
actuated control (Wilson et al 2006). SCATS also provides more consistent delay with 
varying demand as the system adapts to the demand changes. Delay is also distributed 
more evenly across all approaches; however, under certain circumstances the total 
intersection delay may increase (Wolshon and Taylor 1999). Benefits can also be 
measured in terms of improvements in stops, delay and travel time versus fixed time, 
especially when demand increases or when demand varies. This is an advantage when the 
network experiences changes in demand due to incidents, or daily/seasonal variation 
(Chu and Recker 2004).   
 
2.5.2 SCOOT  
Split Cycle and Offset Optimisation Technique (SCOOT) is an adaptive signal control 
system developed by Transport Research Laboratory (United Kingdom). It is similar to 
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SCATS, but relies on upstream detectors, rather than stop line detectors, to determine 
the traffic demand in the system. SCOOT adapts to the traffic by adjusting cycle length 
and phase splits in small increments (Ozbay et al 2006). The SCOOT system also includes 
the Automatic SCOOT Traffic Information Database (ASTRID) which is an historic 
database of traffic information collected by the SCOOT detectors. It also includes 
INteGRated Incident Detection (INGRID) that detects changes in traffic demand to 
determine if there is an incident on the network (Ash 1997). INGRID uses the ASTRID 
data and applies algorithms that analyse the flow and occupancy data to determine if the 
traffic data is different than expected. Occupancy data is analysed upstream and 
downstream to determine where queuing is taking place in the network. The number of 
detectors upstream and downstream affected by the incident as well as the duration of 
the incident determine the confidence in and estimated severity of the incident.   
 
SCOOT is used for signal control in Toronto. Toronto also has an automated incident 
detection system on the motorways. Although Toronto has access to the INGRID feature 
through SCOOT, resources are not in place to implement an effective incident detection 
and management plan on the arterial network. 
 
A study in the Greater Toronto Area investigated the Brock Road Incident Management 
System (Loane and Mackay 2004). Brock Road is an arterial corridor that is affected by 
incidents on the adjacent Highway 401, which is the major east/west commuter route in 
Toronto. The system includes ATMS with responsive control, ATIS and AID at selected 
sites in the corridor. One of the goals of this ongoing study is to develop traffic responsive 
plans to mitigate the impact of incidents on the motorway to the arterial network. 
Modelling was done of various incident scenarios on the motorway to determine the 
impact and to develop various mitigation measures including upgraded responsive control 
algorithms, improved local detection and automated incident detection on the motorway. 
 
Other adaptive signal control systems are available around the world (eg, MOVA, OPAC); 
however, not all of them manage signals on a network-wide basis. Martin et al (2003) 
provide a reasonable overview of the relative capabilities and merits of different systems. 
Because of the predominance of SCATS use in New Zealand, further discussion and 
analysis in this study will be based around SCATS; however, many of the principles would 
be equally applicable using other systems. 
 
2.5.3 Paramics 
Much of the development of traffic models in recent times has focused on (often complex) 
urban and motorway networks. In the past, computing power has limited the ability to 
model these networks in great detail, resulting in macro-simulation packages that rely 
largely on speed-flow curves or macro-flow profiles to determine link flows and 
efficiencies eg, SATURN by WS Atkins (United Kingdom). Now a number of software tools 
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have been developed to take advantage of microsimulation techniques and one such tool 
is Paramics, produced by SIAS Ltd (Scotland)1. 
 
Paramics simulates the individual vehicles that make up traffic flow and congestion, and 
presents its output as a real-time visual display for traffic management and road network 
design. Paramics microsimulation is concerned with modelling individual vehicles for the 
duration of their journey through a network, with the route that a driver chooses not 
being predetermined, but depending on the network situation being encountered. The 
conditions in the model vary with time and drivers adapt their behaviour (eg, route 
choice) in response to this. Thus a Paramics model is not a traditional network equilibrium 
model, but a dynamic model. 
 
One of the strengths of this microsimulation is that it can show an easily understood 
graphical display of real-time traffic flow on a computer screen. Although measurement 
and validation of network statistics will still be required to confirm the model's accuracy, 
major problems can be quickly identified using the maxim ‘if it looks wrong, it probably is 
wrong’. This approach should help to minimise coding errors, as opposed to the traditional 
model analysis by abstract accumulation of numerical data and related plots. The visual 
display also enhances the perceived validity of such models with both transport 
professionals and lay people alike. 
 
Paramics has been developed over more than 15 years by UK traffic and transportation 
engineers. The name Paramics (‘Parallel microsimulation’) is a legacy of its initial focus 
on running complex simulations on parallel processors. Earlier versions were only 
available for Unix systems, such as Linux PCs and Solaris servers, but the software has 
been mainly supported on Windows PC versions only for the last few years. Figure 2.5 
shows an example of 3D visual modelling within Paramics (models can also be viewed in 
2D or batch-run without visualisation). 
 
Figure 2.5 Paramics simulation 
Three interacting models applied at the same time govern the movement of individual 
vehicles in a Paramics model; car following, gap acceptance and lane changing. In 
addition, drivers have certain behavioural characteristics randomly assigned to them – 
‘aggression’ and ‘awareness’. These factors represent the characteristics of drivers that 
                                              
1
 It should be noted that, due to the original joint Paramics developers SIAS and Quadstone going 
their separate ways a few years ago, there are actually two versions of Paramics commercially 
available; Q-Paramics and S-Paramics. The latter is being used in this study. 
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result in their different performances with regard to gap acceptance, car following and 
lane changing. Top speed, headway and lane usage are also influenced by these factors. 
Some simple vehicle dynamics are also taken into account, such as size, weight (eg, for 
tonnage restrictions), acceleration and deceleration. 
 
The road network is coded into the software in considerable detail and the success of the 
modelling depends somewhat on the accuracy of the road layout description. Unlike 
macroscopic network models, neither travel times nor intersection capacities are entered 
into the model. The input data includes details of nodes, links and a large number of other 
details describing the network, such as number of lanes, parking or bus lanes, bus stop 
positions, traffic signal data, movement definitions and priorities at intersections etc. 
 
The most recent versions of Paramics have been able to simulate area-wide traffic control 
operations, using real-time urban traffic control (UTC) systems linked to a model of 
simulated traffic flows. Adaptive traffic control systems such as SCOOT or SCATS can be 
linked to Paramics, enabling the dynamic exchange of data between an external traffic 
control system and the simulated loops and traffic signals within the microsimulation 
model. In this way Paramics models can include signal operations optimised to variable 
traffic conditions and provide an ideal facility for testing UTC systems prior to installation.  
 
Incidents can be modelled in Paramics using the incident editor (SIAS 2005). During a 
modelled incident, vehicles will slow down and/or stop for the duration of the modelled 
incident. The information input into Paramics to model an incident include: the duration of 
the incident, the speed of the vehicles (zero for stopped), turn delay experienced by 
affected vehicles (seconds), lane(s) affected and the incident rate (the percentage of 
vehicles using the specified lane that will incur the incident). If ‘feedback’ is turned on, 
vehicles will re-route to avoid additional delay caused by the incident.   
 
ITS measures can also be modelled including VMS signs and transmitters (vehicles receive 
information about the incident when they are in a defined area). The incident information 
can include speed restrictions, lane restrictions, delay warnings, diversion routing and 
car-park availability advice. Drivers’ aggression, awareness and headways (for a specified 
area such as a ramp) can also be modified during the incident. The ITS messages can be 
applied to all vehicles, or to specific vehicle types.  
 
Apart from Paramics, a number of similar network microsimulation packages have also 
been developed in recent years, such as AIMSUN (TSS, Spain), VISSIM (PTV, Germany), 
and DRACULA (ITS Leeds and WS Atkins, United Kingdom). While some of these models 
have had limited use in New Zealand over recent years (and in some cases have 
particular advantages over Paramics), the predominant microsimulation modelling to date 
in New Zealand has been with Paramics. 
 
The University of New South Wales has developed a microsimulation model called SITRAS 
that can be used to model incidents on urban road networks. This is used to evaluate 
various incident management strategies for various types of incidents. It can also be used 
to determine the demand for various detour routes (Hidas 2001). 
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2.5.4 Modelling incidents with SCATS  
SCATS was not originally developed as an incident management system (and certainly not 
a motorway management system), and this seems to be reflected in its relatively limited 
ability to detect and treat significant incidents. However, increasingly attempts are being 
made to use it as such a system. 
 
Martin et al (2003) note that because SCATS measures the degree of saturation based on 
detector occupancy, rather than the actual volume departing from the intersection, the 
detector cannot differentiate between a high-flow rate (high occupancy and large number 
of vehicles departing from the intersection) and intersection blockage (high occupancy but 
low number of vehicles departing from the intersection). Hence, SCATS cannot easily 
respond to congestion when the queue from one intersection completely fills the link and 
blocks the upstream intersection. 
 
A key issue is the fact that SCATS is traditionally based around stop-line detectors (as 
opposed to SCOOT’s upstream detectors), making it harder to detect the presence of 
large queues upstream of the intersection. However, it is possible to install additional 
detectors upstream to help address common congestion issues, and this has been done in 
some locations in Auckland (Evans 2006). 
 
Royce et al (2006) also notes that certain intersection lane configurations do not help 
SCATS to determine the most optimal phasing:  
 
Short lanes can affect lane use at intersection limit lines. The traffic flow on short 
lanes can be less (because of blockage), and therefore the SCATS degree of 
saturation can be less than otherwise would be if the lanes were used fully. SCATS 
therefore may allocate less green signal time to the approach than it needs to, since 
the degree of saturation would appear to be lower. For SCATS to operate correctly, 
the short lane must be long enough to always discharge at the maximum rate. 
 
Lane utilisation is averaged in SCATS. Actual lane utilisation in many intersections can be 
poor, thus producing unused capacity, but the critical lane is not identified in SCATS. 
Tools such as LNSAT can be used to predict lane usage. 
 
A study in Michigan attempted to use real SCATS data from SCATS-controlled 
intersections along with Police reports of traffic incidents and correlate them to determine 
how SCATS currently handles incidents (Taylor and Abdel-Rahim 1998). However, it 
became too difficult to match up the exact time of the incidents on the network. Instead, 
incidents were modelled in NETSIM and various incident management strategies were 
evaluated on a theoretical grid network. The strategies tested included signal control 
strategies, vehicle routing strategies and a combination of both. The signal strategies 
involved adjusting the signal timings to meter traffic at intersections upstream of the 
incident to avoid queuing. As the traffic demand increased, the effectiveness of these 
strategies also increased. The metering of traffic was effective, but only if there was 
sufficient storage to handle the queued vehicles.  
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The latest versions of SCATS now have an ‘unusual congestion monitor’ to try to identify 
abnormal situations. The RTA have also written a SCATS History Reader, to help use 
historical traffic data for testing the effects of incidents and treatments, and the 
University of South Australia has developed an automated procedure for analysing 
historical SCATS data (Taylor pers comm). Transit NZ has also had discussions with 
VicRoads and RTA who are using the Advanced Real-time Traffic Information System 
(ARTIS) software to dynamically assess network performance; a pilot of 100 junctions in 
Auckland is planned (Whyte pers comm). 
 
2.5.5 Adaptive signal control and microsimulation 
The effects of proposed ITS measures such as adaptive signal control and incident 
management strategies can be difficult to predict and evaluate using traffic flow theories, 
but can be modelled using microsimulation models such as Paramics. The modelled routes 
taken during incidents may depend on the base calibration formulation of the model. The 
changes in driver behaviour during an incident may not necessarily be well captured by 
the base calibration and it is probably necessary to investigate calibrating a model to 
incident conditions. 
 
By default, fixed signal phase times are specified in most microsimulation models. It is 
common practice to model SCATS-controlled intersections in microsimulation models by 
using the average timings from SCATS. For forecast scenarios, the timings, phasing and 
offsets can be optimised in an external package such as TRANSYT for input into a 
microsimulation model, whereas the future intersections are actually likely to be 
controlled by SCATS. It is difficult to effectively model SCATS-controlled signals using 
fixed-time signal plans (Zhang and Taylor 2006). This problem can be compounded when 
modelling incidents, as fixed-time signals are unable to react to the change in demand 
resulting from incidents. Therefore, linking a microsimulation model directly to SCATS, 
instead of using fixed-time or actuated control, produces more consistent, stable, reliable 
and realistic results (Sissons 2006).  
 
Incorporating SCATS signal control rather than fixed-time signals in a model can better 
replicate the existing conditions as well as future conditions and test scenarios for incident 
management modelling. As traffic networks become congested, the demand can exceed 
the capacity of the network. Microsimulation models output information only for the 
vehicles that were loaded onto the network during the simulation period. This does not 
account for the unmet demand that was unable to be loaded onto the network due to 
capacity constraints. Post-processing of the output can be done to account for the 
vehicles that basically remained queued in the zones (Sissons 2006), although it may be 
be difficult to identify how many of these trips in reality would be postponed or cancelled. 
 
The RTA has worked with developers of microsimulation tools to develop interfaces 
between SCATS and microsimulation models including Q-Paramics, S-Paramics, AIMSUN 
and VISSIM (Lowrie 2006). Baseplus in Christchurch has recently developed 
baseplusFUSE to link SCATS to S-Paramics (Transit NZ 2006b).  
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In normal on-street applications, SCATS uses information from vehicle detectors, pre-
determined operation boundaries and historical data to determine cycle times, phase 
splits, phase sequences and coordination offsets. BaseplusFUSE enables the actual on-
street operation of SCATS-controlled intersections to be replicated in S-Paramics. It is 
relatively simple to code intersections in S-Paramics to be linked to SCATS through Fuse. 
Allowed and banned movements and vehicle detector locations are coded in S-Paramics 
and the signal ‘personalities’ are dropped into WinTraff, which emulates the signal 
controllers. S-Paramics, WinTraff and SCATSim (software that replicates SCATS when 
connected to a traffic model) can all be run on the same computer (see Figure 2.6). 
 
 
Figure 2.6 baseplusFUSE, Paramics and SCATS. 
Theoretically, microsimulation models could be linked directly to a live traffic situation, to 
enable ‘on-the-fly’ assessment of incidents, modelling and performance evaluation of 
possible treatment measures (or of no treatment) and resolution of an appropriate 
strategy. The key to this would be faster-than-real-time modelling speed (and possibly 
parallel systems testing different scenarios), so that evaluation could be done in a timely 
manner to give useful information. 
2.6 New Zealand and the international context 
In New Zealand the most complex congestion management systems are currently 
operated by the Auckland and Wellington Traffic Management Units (TMUs), overseen by 
Transit NZ. Because of the larger, more congested network covered by the Auckland TMU, 
and its proximity to our key researcher, most of the investigations in this report are based 
on the Auckland situation. 
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2.6.1 Incident management in Auckland 
The TMU draft regional CCTV and VMS strategy outlines the short, medium- and long-
term implementation of VMS and CCTV on arterial roads in the Auckland region (Transit 
NZ 2006b). One of the purposes of this system is to create an efficient system of incident 
management. One of the benefits is that it will provide notification of incidents as well as 
alternate routes. 
 
There are currently over 100 CCTV installations in the Auckland region. They are used for 
incident management on the motorways and traffic signal management on the arterials. 
Currently CCTV cameras are only installed at a few hot spots on the arterial network. 
There are 11 permanent VMS on Auckland’s motorways used for incident management 
and motorway operations and six portable VMS used for incident and special event 
management. Figure 2.7 shows an example of one such VMS, approaching the moveable 
lane barriers on the Auckland Harbour bridge. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Example of variable message sign on Auckland Motorway network. 
 
The Auckland TMU was established by Transit NZ in 2003 to provide Auckland with 
integrated traffic management for the region. The TMU released the Auckland incident 
management strategy in January 2005 (Transit NZ 2005). The strategy is applied to all 
roads on the primary network, defined as ‘all regional and district arterials, plus all roads 
with traffic signals which, if closed as a result of an incident, will result in severe 
congestion on alternate routes’. The benefits of improved incident management include 
more reliable travel time on the transportation network, resulting in reduced 
transportation costs and improved traveller information. One of the issues outlined with 
the current transportation system includes capacity problems on detour routes, 
particularly during the peak periods that may be unable to cope with the increased 
demand resulting from diverted traffic.   
 
Auckland Traffic and Transport Operation Monitoring Service (ATTOMS) is Transit NZ’s 
Auckland Traffic Management Centre and manages Auckland’s motorways and traffic 
signal operation on key regional arterial roads. ATTOMS includes a control centre 
operating 24 hours a day that operates Auckland’s Advanced Traffic Management System 
(ATMS) and Advanced Traffic Information System (ATIS). Operators at ATTOMS monitor 
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CCTV cameras and control VMS in order to manage incidents and events on the motorway 
network. ATTOMS also operates the traffic signal system for the Auckland region, which is 
controlled by SCATS. Trained SCATS operators monitor and adjust, as necessary, the 
signal system. Figure 2.8 shows the view inside the ATTOMS centre. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 ATTOMS Control Centre. 
 
ATTOMS has extensive CCTV coverage of Auckland’s motorways and is able to quickly 
detect and verify incidents, and works closely with the Police to provide suitable 
responses. Another major source of incident detection is calls from the general public as 
well as from the Police. These calls can be verified using CCTV. On some central parts of 
the motorway network, there are loop detectors located at 500 m spacings that collect 
speed and occupancy data. The detectors were used as part of an AID system, but this 
system is not currently in use. As Auckland’s traffic network expands, extensions to the 
existing traffic management systems will be deployed, including robust AID capabilities. 
Figure 2.9 shows an example of the range of visual and numerical data that can be 
viewed remotely to help monitor traffic flows. 
 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ON NETWORK RELIABILITY  
32 
 
Figure 2.9 Example of TMU monitoring data (Wellington Motorway network). 
 
Detour plans are in place to manage incidents on Auckland’s motorways. The detour plans 
include a listing of all of the signalised intersections on each detour route as well as the 
phase affected by the detour. The SCATS operators can then provide additional green 
time as required during the detour. As the CCTV coverage on the arterial network is 
limited, the SCATS operators generally rely on information they receive from the incident 
response unit (generally the Police) as well as the SCATS detector information to 
determine manual adjustments. 
 
2.6.2 Incident monitoring in New South Wales, Australia 
The Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (RTA) has a Transport Management 
Centre that is the command and control centre for the operational management of the 
NSW road network (RTA 2005). The Transport Operations Planning Section has developed 
formal response plans for certain sections of the roadway. The plan may contain 
information on alternate routes. The network operation officers monitor the effectiveness 
of the traffic signal system controlled by SCATS. The system is continually tuned using 
advanced traffic modelling techniques and then adapts to changing traffic demand. 
 
The Transport Operations Room monitors and manages incidents on the network using 
over 400 CCTV cameras and 54 VMS. There are over 2800 SCATS-controlled intersections 
in the traffic network. 
 
The Incident Management System stores incident response plans that are matched to the 
incident data to give the operator a choice of response plans (local, tactical or strategic 
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response plan). The type of response chosen will depend on the extent of the area 
affected (eg, viable diversion routes). Incident detection algorithms use speed, flow and 
occupancy data obtained from loop detectors spaced at 500 m on the motorways. SCATS 
detectors at intersections are used to detect unusual traffic flow and alert the Incident 
Management System. Incidents are also detected manually from Police, media and calls 
from the public. 
 
2.6.3 United States incident management and adaptive signal control 
In the United States, it is estimated that over half of all freeway congestion is caused by 
incidents (USDoT 2000). Most incident management strategies are focused on freeway 
incidents and the integration of the arterial network signal control with incident 
management is not common practice. However, route diversion is an effective incident 
management strategy and coordinated arterial signal control during incidents should be 
part of an effective incident management programme.   
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) developed a framework for implementing 
adaptive signal control strategies in 1992 called Real-time Traffic Adaptive Control System 
(RT-TRACS). This included the development of Optimized Policies for Adaptive Control 
(OPAC) (Gartner et al 2001). The City of South Lyon, Michigan has installed SCATS-
controlled signals as part of the Faster and Safer Travel-Traffic Routing and Advanced 
Controls (FAST-TRAC) programme. This programme has proved to be quite effective. 
Although much research has been done to evaluate various adaptive control strategies, 
their use is still quite limited in the United States (Fehon 2005).   
 
2.6.4 Scottish traffic monitoring 
Traffic Scotland enables the collection and distribution of real-time traffic information 
relating to incidents and events currently taking place on the Scottish trunk (arterial) road 
network (Scotland Transport 2007). This is known as the National Driver Information and 
Control System (NADICS). 
 
Road users on Scotland's trunk roads are provided with information about road conditions 
with the aim of ensuring that best use is made of the existing Scottish trunk road network 
and to improve the safety and the efficiency of the network. By displaying messages on 
VMS, drivers are given advance warning of problems on the Scottish trunk road network. 
These may include roadworks, accidents, events, bad weather conditions and road closures.  
 
On part of the trunk road network, overhead lane signalling improves road safety by 
telling drivers of lane closures and speed restrictions. This information can help drivers 
make the best response – from slowing down and changing lanes, through to selecting 
the best alternative route. When there are no known traffic incidents, safety messages 
are displayed. 
 
Traffic Scotland is operated from the National Network Control Centre (NNCC), which is a 
24-hour driver information and traffic control centre. From the NNCC, the trunk road 
network traffic conditions are monitored, using loops in the road and closed circuit 
television cameras. 
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The Police, from their own control rooms, are responsible for setting localised VMS and 
lane control signals during the initial stages of a traffic incident. The setting of strategic 
signing across the Scottish trunk road network is the role of the NNCC. The Police also 
answer and handle all telephone calls from the motorway emergency telephones. Trunk 
road maintenance operators, who are responsible for maintaining the trunk road network, 
advise the NNCC of roadworks planned and currently underway. 
 
When traffic disruption is detected, the incident details are entered into Traffic Scotland's 
central computer system either manually or automatically. When the response to the 
incident is assessed, appropriate messages on VMS and/or control signalling are set. 
Traffic Scotland is able to assess the impact of various types of incidents and quickly react 
with the most appropriate response. Appropriate information is also passed on to the 
media and motoring organisations for radio broadcast. 
 
Depending on the type of incident, two types of responses can be displayed to the road 
users: 
• Strategic response: VMS located at key points in the Scottish trunk road network 
advise drivers of incidents and delays that lie ahead. This allows drivers to adjust their 
journey as they travel between the major urban areas. 
• Local response: VMS and regularly spaced overhead lane signals on urban 
motorways provide warning and information to drivers concerning local traffic 
incidents, roadworks and delays. Automatic traffic detectors and closed circuit 
television allow rapid detection and response to traffic problems.  
 
In addition to VMS and overhead lane signals, real-time information is distributed using 
the Traffic Scotland website and associated WAP and PDA services. 
 
A similar system, Motorway Incident Detection and Automatic Signalling (MIDAS), has 
been implemented on the United Kingdom motorway network since 1995 (Morris and 
Negus 1997). This system is also more advanced in active traffic management control 
philosophies (eg, hard-shoulder running, mandatory speed signs). 
2.7 Implications of literature findings 
The literature review from the current project indicates a lack of combined research in this 
area, both in New Zealand and elsewhere. Research has been done in the areas of 
incident detection and management, ITS methods such as adaptive signal control (eg, 
SCATS) and network reliability measures. However, little research has been done to bring 
these three research areas together. 
 
While the Auckland and Wellington TMUs make use of the SCATS system and incident 
monitoring tools, there is no automated means of combining the two and it is not clear 
what the relative effectiveness of existing incident management methods are. There is 
also no published data on the frequency, impacts and other characteristics of incidents in 
New Zealand; some analysis of ATTOMS data may be necessary to determine the scale of 
the problem in Auckland at least. 
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Elsewhere in the world, the Scottish NADICS system is worthy of further investigation, 
particularly in terms of its system organisation and VMS strategies. Closer to home, 
Australian state systems provide good practical experience of incorporating SCATS 
systems into wider network management and incident detection programmes. While the 
United States has traditionally been to the fore in terms of freeway management systems, 
the relative lack of use of adaptive traffic signal systems hinders their usefulness in the 
New Zealand context. 
 
While major motorway networks are now increasingly being set up to detect incidents, the 
detection of incidents on lesser arterial road networks is currently fairly limited. However, 
incidents on one part of the network (motorway or arterials) show no such distinction in 
terms of their effects across other parts of the network. It would seem a sensible 
strategy, therefore, to enable more integrated incident management systems (both at the 
hardware and personnel levels) that considered the entire arterial road network. 
 
Adaptive signal control systems such as SCATS have clearly proven their worth under 
typical operating conditions, although that still relies on them being set up properly to 
produce optimal timing patterns. It is less clear how well they work under abnormal 
incident conditions, and how much they need to be modified under these circumstances to 
best manage the effects and return the network to normal as efficiently as possible. Some 
key questions to investigate include: 
• Is normal SCATS operation actually OK without intervention during incidents? 
(probably not in many cases) 
• How much benefit is there in just optimising normal SCATS operation so that it is 
more efficiently run? For example, in Christchurch, intersections are reviewed on a 
five-yearly basis using updated count data and other information (crashes, network 
changes, etc). 
• How beneficial is it to produce relatively generic alternative SCATS plans that can be 
quickly implemented should an appropriate incident be detected? 
 
It is notable that the competing SCOOT system seems to be more capable in incident 
detection, partly due to greater software development in this area and partly due to its 
upstream traffic detector architecture. The latter issue can, however, be addressed in 
SCATS by employing greater use of upstream queue detectors in addition to the stop-line 
detectors. 
 
A basic problem in assessing the effectiveness of real-world applications of incident 
management is that such interventions cannot be objectively measured in a comparative 
manner by whatever metric (eg, additional journey delays, time to restore the network to 
normal operation). While these measures can be monitored, the precise conditions of a 
real-world incident are highly variable and unable to be replicated to allow straightforward 
before-after comparisons. Trend analysis of multiple incidents may be able to provide 
some comparative assessment but, otherwise, traffic simulation is the only means to 
precisely replicate traffic incident conditions. 
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Microsimulation is thus a good tool for evaluating incident management strategies; 
however, there is a lack of good real incident data available. Incident data can be 
generated using microsimulation, but it may be necessary to better calibrate 
microsimulation models to incident conditions (where driver behaviour may be different 
than under normal conditions). Microsimulation models should be linked to SCATS to 
provide better results than fixed-time signal systems, both for existing conditions and for 
modelling incidents.   
 
The ever-changing nature of ITS technology may mean that some newer congestion 
management treatments may emerge by the time this research is fully completed. While 
we do not expect this to make current systems and treatments immediately redundant, 
this does need to be constantly monitored. 
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3. Modelling methodology 
Based on the findings from the literature review and discussions amongst the research 
team, industry steering group and other relevant people, an outline plan of the modelling 
tasks to be undertaken was developed. This included a list of potential situations or 
treatments to examine in modelling, although most of them would be investigated at a 
later stage of the project. 
3.1 Proposed modelling 
The initial work was an exploratory study modelling incident detection and response in a 
New Zealand urban network using microsimulation. It was proposed to set up a replica of 
an existing urban network (or part thereof) and model the performance of the network 
(eg, in terms of total travel times, delays and stops) under various abnormal conditions 
(eg, by introduction of a ‘blockage’). The model would include a simulation of the SCATS 
signal control system to assess how well it automatically responded to significant changes 
in network flows. The same network would then be tested using alternative management 
plans (either pre-existing or newly derived) to assess their effectiveness at improving 
overall network reliability. Different measures of network performance and reliability 
would be assessed for their usefulness in evaluating options. 
 
Particular questions to be assessed would be: 
• How well do existing traffic signal control systems (eg SCATS) identify and handle 
significant incidents, in terms of network reliability? 
• How do specific incident management plans compare with default schemes when 
handling significant incidents? 
• What is the impact of different response times to the overall performance and 
recovery of the network during and after an incident? 
• How can incident management plans be automatically invoked when significant 
incidents occur? 
• How do motorists perform when faced with congestion related to an incident, 
particularly when provided with information about the situation and alternatives? 
3.2 Key testing factors 
The proposed modelling would involve a number of key factors: 
• incident scenarios to be replicated 
• management treatments to be tested 
• performance measures to be evaluated  
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These are discussed in more detail below. 
 
3.2.1 Incident scenarios 
For the incidents to be replicated, combinations of different types of incidents should be 
considered such as: 
• Planned (eg, event) or unplanned (eg, accident) incidents. There is likely to be 
more interest in unplanned rather than expected events (where a contingency plan 
may already be prepared), as there is usually a need to determine acceptable 
treatment solutions in a relatively short time-frame. 
• Incidents on the motorway versus those on the surrounding arterial network. It 
would be ideal to test both situations as there are likely to be different 
response/intervention times, given the lack of incident detection off the motorway 
corridors. 
• Varied capacity reduction, from speed reduction to single lane blockage to total 
road closure. For example, a major incident on one side of a road may also have 
some effect on the opposing traffic; a 20–30 km/h speed reduction on a road 
segment could be used to represent ‘rubber necking’. 
• A range of response times by authorities in resolving the incident. For example, an 
incident on the motorway may have a quick response (due to good CCTV coverage), 
whereas an incident on an arterial road may have a slower response (due to the 
longer time to detect it, particularly in terms of effects on the monitored parts of the 
network). 
 
The time period to be modelled (and subsequent volume/capacity ratios) would also 
greatly affect the effects of any incident modelled. A network with relatively low traffic 
volumes (eg, late at night) may see little effect on travellers if an incident occurs, and 
thus fairly few benefits accrue from any management treatments. Conversely, for a 
network already operating at near capacity, it may be very difficult (if not impossible) to 
achieve any meaningful improvement in network performance if an incident occurs. 
Taking these factors into consideration, for the purposes of this exercise, the assumed 
modelling time period would be the shoulder of the peak period, where some excess 
capacity on the network still exists but traffic is still relatively sensitive to any incidents. 
 
Similarly, it must be accepted that some extreme-demand incidents are probably 
impossible to handle adequately by any intervention, eg, the recent opening of the Sylvia 
Park shopping complex in Auckland (NZ Herald 2006). 
 
One aspect of network reliability that may be worth considering when creating suitable 
incidents is where the most vulnerable points in the network are, ie:  
• Where are incidents most likely to occur? This may be as a consequence of the road 
geometry or location of key conflict points (eg, location of high numbers of crossing, 
merging, weaving manoeuvres). 
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• Where are incidents most likely to have the greatest impacts on overall network 
performance? This may be in terms of network topology (ie, few alternative routes) or 
locations of greatest demand for links. 
• Are incidents more likely to occur at certain times or with certain volumes? Speed-
volume relationships may mean, for example, that low-speed near-capacity situations 
are not as hazardous as higher-speed medium flow situations. 
 
ATTOMS produces monthly reports of notable events; these could be used to determine 
suitable timeframes and locations for modelled incidents. 
 
3.2.2 Management treatments  
The work to date has identified various treatments to be evaluated: 
• Letting the existing SCATS setup automatically adjust to the new situation by 
itself (either in an optimised or ‘sub-optimal’ SCATS configuration). Since SCATS is 
designed to dynamically adjust the system to better manage flows, its ability to do 
this under all circumstances needs to be tested. It should be noted, however, that by 
default, SCATS has been ‘dampened’ down to change behaviour gradually. 
• Changing SCATS signal timing plans so that alternative detour routes are given 
greater priority. Key issues will be in determining suitably generic alternative plans 
that can be applied to a range of incidents, knowing when to apply such a plan in lieu 
of the default configuration and knowing which plan to apply. 
• Providing driver information (eg, through dynamic VMS or in-car navigation) and 
advising motorists of the incident and suggested detours. As well as determining 
suitable communication strategies, some local research is probably necessary to 
determine driver response to this information. 
• Limiting additional vehicles into the incident-affected section (eg, via ramp 
metering or reduced signal phases). While this may help to limit the local effects of an 
incident, it needs to be compared with the wider network effects of shifting some 
traffic elsewhere, or causing cancellation or postponement of trips. 
• Temporarily reallocating roadway space (eg, allowing shoulder or bus-lane use 
by general traffic, or reassigning variable traffic lanes). Again, key issues are to 
identify when this is appropriate and the broader network-wide effects of doing so. 
 
Note that some of these treatments could be implemented together. 
 
The biggest difficulty will probably be in determining the most suitable (or a sufficiently 
suitable) treatment for the particular incident being considered. There are a lot of 
different scenarios in many potential locations and treatments cannot be generalised for 
all scenarios. Ultimately, for a large complex network, it may require a considerably large 
selection of management plans to be developed to cover the range of incidents that may 
occur (particularly with regard to location). Investigation of specific case studies, as is 
being done here, may produce solutions that are only applicable to that particular 
situation and not widely applicable elsewhere. While to a certain degree this is always the 
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case, the study will endeavour to infer general conclusions based on observed trends 
across a number of different test cases, and from the literature review. 
 
For longer incidents, it may be that a suitable treatment strategy can be identified once 
some traffic data has been obtained either from field observations or modelling. For 
example, when maintenance works were carried out on the Mangere Bridge in Auckland, 
reducing its capacity, there were initially significant delays across the network. Once the 
capacity reduction was known, the Auckland TMU was able to modify SCATS to cope and 
there was a 30% increase in throughput after the appropriate changes were made (Monk 
pers.comm). 
 
Systems such as SCATS can also be adjusted manually to deal with incidents, but 
generally CCTV coverage is needed to see effects and adjust the system accordingly. The 
base personality does not change, but order of phases and ‘voting’ can be changed. 
Parameters can be set up to make these changes. 
 
3.2.3 Performance measures 
From the simulation runs, various measures can be defined and collected to evaluate the 
effectiveness of treatments:  
• Overall total network travel times. For most economic evaluations of treatments, 
this provides the most authoritative measure of effectiveness. However, it may not 
always match the desired objectives of transportation agencies or the perceived 
effects on road users. 
• Variability in vehicle travel times. As discussed in section 2.4.1 above, this measure 
may provide useful information about the way the performance of the network is 
perceived by road users. 
• Amount of detouring undertaken by motorists. The level of diversion will be affected 
by the relative proportion of familiar and unfamiliar drivers (a parameter that can be 
set in Paramics) and the available alternative route information (eg, VMS, in-car 
navigation). It is likely that unfamiliar drivers will be making longer trips, either in 
terms of distance (by not knowing about short-cuts) or in time (by staying on the 
originally affected route). 
• Time to recover to normal travel times following an incident. Two things that can 
affect this are the time taken to detect an incident (and respond accordingly to it) and 
the treatment applied to clear any built-up queues once the initial trigger event itself 
has been resolved. 
• Relative performance of motorway network versus arterial network. Unless a 
reduction in overall travel demand is achieved, any treatments to divert traffic or 
change route priorities will have a positive effect on some road users and negative 
effect on others. Given the different functions of different parts of the network (eg, 
through-movement versus local access) it may be deemed acceptable for some parts 
of the network rather than others to bear the burden of additional delays. Flow 
weighting could be used to capture this effect. 
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If using modelling to derive predicted performance measures, it is important to remember 
that measures such as overall network travel time are only comparable if the whole traffic 
demand is able to get onto the network in each scenario; there may be a need to ensure 
that the modelled period is long enough to capture this.  
 
Over time, any changes in the capacity of the network or in the way that incidents are 
treated may affect the relative demand for travel on that network. For example, people 
who currently avoid travelling at certain times or on certain routes because of the 
consequences of any incidents, may shift their departure times or route choices if they 
find that incidents there are now being better dealt with. For now at least, our ‘design 
incidents’ will assume no long-term change in travel behaviour. 
 
Incidents will usually cause localised travel time changes and thus the impact will be 
greater on local trips. Longer trips will not be affected as much, in relative terms. Factors 
can be developed to dampen the measured reliability based on total trip time. 
3.3 Modelling considerations 
For this study it was proposed that S-Paramics, WinTraff and FUSE software would be 
used to model the road network, control traffic signals (replicating SCATS management of 
them) and respond to simulated incidents. Key information such as overall travel times 
and number of stoppages could then be extracted from the microsimulation model for 
analysis. 
 
It was envisaged that at least one model from a major New Zealand city (Auckland, 
Wellington, Christchurch) would be set up to investigate the issues raised above. Based 
on discussions with the research review team and other industry practitioners, attention 
focused initially on a suitable model from the Auckland region. Section 4 describes the 
preliminary model tested. 
 
It may be difficult to test some particular scenarios on this preliminary network or another 
suitable real network. If necessary, theoretical test networks could be created to replicate 
real-life conditions instead, although then there would not be any opportunity to validate 
the model against real-world field data. 
 
For practical purposes, it has to be assumed that any incident to be modelled would occur 
within the model area and that its effects would also be sufficiently captured within this 
area. Technically this may be difficult to achieve unless an exceptionally large network is 
modelled. A SATURN model of a larger area could be used to capture any wider changes 
in demand resulting from an incident; this may be considered at a later date. 
 
At the very least, the traffic demand should be consistent across all scenarios. It is 
important to make sure that all of the demand is loaded onto the network and trips are 
not queued into zones at the end of the simulation run. This is achieved by simulating a 
sufficiently long ’after’ period to make sure that the incident and its effects clear up 
during the simulation run. 
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Microsimulation has a variability in demand (due to the stochastic nature of the 
simulation), which affects predicted travel times. Microsimulation linked to SCATS will 
cause even greater variability. Multiple simulation runs therefore become important, using 
different ‘random seeds’ to reflect day-to-day variations typically observed (but with the 
same seeds replicated for each treatment option). The results would then be collated and 
performance measure statistics derived. 
 
For the preliminary modelling, field survey data (eg, observed travel times) would not be 
collected to calibrate and validate the model under all circumstances. This data is 
particularly important to confirm driver behaviour patterns under revised network 
management plans (particularly for behaviour-change treatments such as VMS). 
However, the initial aim was to find a model that is at least sufficiently 
calibrated/validated under normal traffic situations. It would be assumed for this stage 
that any models are still valid under incident conditions as well. 
 
Later modelling work could then determine the validity of this assumption in a number of 
ways: 
• Historical SCATS data could be used to determine actual traffic flows, queues, 
phasing, etc during incident conditions. Because of the volume of data obtained, such 
historical data is not usually stored continuously, so particular arrangements would 
need to be made to capture it. The proposed ARTIS software trial in Auckland might 
also provide a more efficient way of storing key incident data. 
• To a large degree, SCATS data is confined to capturing effects at intersections. 
Collecting information along motorway or other arterial corridors is more sporadic. 
However, in the near future Transit NZ plans to have detector loops every 500 m on 
the Auckland Northern Motorway collecting speed/classification data. The ramp 
metering installations in Auckland also collect upstream traffic flow data. 
• Observed field data, such as floating-car runs for travel time and observed queue 
lengths, could be organised. While collecting such data under normal base conditions 
is reasonably straightforward, the challenge is in being able to collect such data 
promptly when an incident occurs (particularly an unplanned one). A suitable number 
of runs may also be needed for statistical confidence in the measures. 
• For planned incidents, such as maintenance works, field data could be collected and 
compared with a similar model. An interesting side-study would be to consider the 
effects on the behaviour of prior knowledge of planned incidents (eg, via media 
reports). In practice, however, most significant planned events are held during off-
peak periods to avoid any major effects on the network.  
• A possibility to consider is artificially contriving a severe incident (eg, a road closure 
during roadworks) and monitoring its effect on the network. The practical and ethical 
implications of doing this would need to be considered however. It is very unlikely 
that a road controlling authority such as Transit NZ would allow such an event on a 
major arterial. 
• Similarly, for testing the effects of VMS locally, various signing strategies may need to 
be trialled in practice and monitored to see their relative effects on route diversion. 
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The costs and practicality of doing this, however, should not be under-estimated. 
Alternatively, it may be possible to test such scenarios on drivers away from the road 
network using a driving simulator. 
• Live traffic data collected for adaptive signals and incident management is not usually 
stored permanently, due to the high storage capacity needed. For high-risk locations 
where incidents are relatively common, it may be feasible to monitor such sites for a 
specific period (eg, switch on saving of data) in order to capture for later analysis 
relevant information during any incidents that occur there. 
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4. Preliminary modelling 
For the initial preliminary modelling, an existing, calibrated model was chosen from North 
Shore City, and referred to as the Wairau Road Model. The model was originally 
developed using S-Paramics to test the impacts of a proposed new land-use development. 
4.1 Model description 
Figure 4.1 shows the approximate location of the Wairau Road Model. The model featured 
a portion of the Auckland Northern Motorway (State Highway 1) as well as a parallel 
signalised route along Wairau and Taharoto Roads. Two interchanges (Tristram Ave and 
Northcote Road) were included to enable motorists to switch between routes. It should be 
noted that this section of the Northern Motorway had also been undergoing significant 
roadworks recently due to the construction of the adjacent Northern Busway and the 
upgraded Esmonde Interchange (bottom of map). 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Location of Wairau Rd Test Model network. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the network layout in the existing model. In looking at the wider road 
network, it can be observed that there were potentially additional links outside of the 
modelled area that might act as suitable parallel detour routes for some motorists (eg, 
Sunnybrae Road). Similarly, major incidents occurring within this model area might 
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produce impacts outside of the model boundaries (eg, further north on the motorway). 
While such modifications to the network would not be undertaken for the preliminary 
modelling, consideration would be given to expanding the model at a later stage to 
include these alternatives. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Layout of Wairau Road Network Model. 
4.2 Incident modelling 
The following features were modelled in this study: 
• One time period 3.15 pm–4.30 pm (before the evening peak) 
• Incidents on motorway SH1 northbound (three-lane section between Tristram and 
Northcote interchanges) see Figure 4.3 
• Closure of the kerb lane from 3.30 pm–4.00 pm and closure of centre lane from 3.30 
pm–3.45 pm. Figure 4.4 shows both incidents. 
 
This scenario was used as the incidents would cause enough congestion on the motorway 
for some motorists to divert onto alternate routes. The pre-peak demand allowed for 
some spare capacity in the network during the base condition. This allowed SCATS an 
opportunity to make changes as the demand changed due to the incidents. When the 
network is already fully congested, SCATS cannot adapt well to the change in demand as 
phases times and cycle lengths may already be at their maximums. 
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Figure 4.3 Location of incidents SH1 northbound. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Two incidents in Paramics. 
Location 
of 
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4.  Preliminary modelling 
47 
The following treatments were tested against these scenarios: 
• SCATS configuration provided in the base condition 
• ‘Good’ SCATS configuration optimised for re-routing from the motorway. 
 
4.2.1 Model results 
The incidents modelled created a great deal of delay northbound on the SH1 motorway 
south of the Tristram interchange. Queues spilled back past the Northcote off-ramp to the 
Northcote on-ramp. This created two diversion scenarios for trips heading northbound on 
SH1 to the northern extent of the model (north of the Tristram interchange). 
 
The first diversion (Northcote Diversion) is shown in magenta in Figure 4.5. Due to the 
additional delay northbound on SH1, vehicles exited at Northcote Road and travelled 
eastbound to Taharoto Road, northbound on Wairau Road and rejoined SH1 at the 
Tristram Avenue interchange.   
 
 
Figure 4.5 Northcote diversion route. 
 
This diversion route was considerably longer with much lower speeds than the motorway. 
In the base condition, no vehicles took this diversion route so the average speed and 
journey time for this route could not be determined. In the incident condition, some 
vehicles took this route due to the stochastic nature of the model even though there was 
no decrease in travel time. When SCATS was modified to give additional priority to the 
northbound Taharoto Road/Wairau Road route, there was a decrease in the travel time 
versus the original SCATS settings. This is shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.    
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Figure 4.6 Travel time comparison for Northcote diversion. 
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Figure 4.7 Average speed comparison for Northcote diversion. 
 
The second diversion (Taharoto Diversion) observed is shown in magenta in Figure 4.8. In 
the base condition, most vehicles travelling northbound on Taharoto Road destined for the 
north end of the model on SH1 took the Northcote on-ramp (route shown in blue). In the 
incident scenario, a portion of these vehicles diverted away from the motorway as the on-
ramp became blocked. Instead they continued northbound on Taharoto Road, onto 
Wairau Road and took the Tristram on-ramp to SH1 northbound. 
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Figure 4.8 Taharoto diversion route. 
 
Again, with the modifications to SCATS for priority in the Taharoto/Wairau route, the 
average travel times were reduced. The results of the Taharoto Diversion are shown in 
Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.9 Travel time comparison for Taharoto diversion. 
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Figure 4.10 Average speed comparison for Taharoto diversion. 
4.3 Discussion 
The modelling work showed that an improvement in travel time for traffic diverted due to 
incidents could be achieved with modifications to SCATS. The modifications made were 
minor and similar to the modifications a SCATS operator at the ATTOMS traffic control 
centre would make when such an incident was detected on the motorway. The changes 
were made only for the duration of the incident after which SCATS reverted to the original 
settings. Although the improvement in travel times was small, if specific incident plans for 
particular incidents were developed, it is likely that the optimisation of the detour route 
could be improved. 
 
The results also highlighted how such incident management plans are most effective 
when: 
• there are sufficient vehicles present to benefit from any plan implemented (and 
hence, justify the work required to do this) 
• there is sufficient capacity to enable diversion routes to work better than the original 
route. 
 
The modelling also showed that the benefits of incident management plans may be 
limited to some particular journey paths. For example, travellers already on the motorway 
generally did not benefit by diverting onto the local road network; their journey still took 
longer via the diversion route even with the incident in place. However, local road 
travellers who had not yet entered the motorway could benefit by being diverted further 
north before joining the motorway. Thus modelling provides an important tool in 
determining which motorists should be given prioritised corridors and related diversion 
information. 
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5. Conclusion  
A literature review of techniques and software/systems to manage traffic congestion and 
respond to incidents found that: 
• considerable research has been done in the areas of incident detection and 
management, ITS methods such as adaptive signal control (eg, SCATS) and network 
reliability measures. However, little work has been done to bring all three research 
areas together 
• while automated incident detection techniques on traffic networks have become 
increasingly sophisticated, in practice there is still limited use (and trust) of them. 
However, there has been some success in using simple detection systems to monitor 
and treat isolated problems such as intersection approach queues 
• motorway incident detection is often relatively well established, but there has been 
less attention to incident monitoring of arterial road networks. This is despite the fact 
that such incidents regularly affect the adjacent motorway networks, and vice versa 
• there is a lack of robust incident detection available at present in New Zealand. The 
Auckland TMU is expanding its data collection in order to improve its response to the 
traffic conditions and respond to incidents 
• there is a lot of variability in the effectiveness of using driver information systems 
such as VMS to redirect road users away from incidents. However, it is possible to 
‘learn’ the effectiveness of such treatments in a particular location using an expert 
system and cumulative treatment/effect data 
• while overall network travel time is still a strong measure of network performance 
during incidents, other measures such as variability of travel times and time to 
recovery may be just as important for motorists and other parties 
• SCATS was not originally developed as an incident management system and has a 
relatively limited ability to detect and treat significant incidents. However, its 
predominance here in New Zealand means that it has an important role to play in any 
such system 
• modelling dynamically adaptive signal control systems using microsimulation enables 
a more realistic response to be produced (compared with fixed-time signal systems) 
when testing the effects of incidents on the network 
• although microsimulation is a good tool for evaluating incident management 
strategies, using a model calibrated under normal operating conditions may not be 
sufficient to properly test incident scenarios. It may be necessary to calibrate 
microsimulation models using data from real incident conditions (where driver 
behaviour may be different than under normal conditions). The practicality and 
robustness of doing this will need to be assessed too. 
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An exploratory study modelling incident detection and response in a New Zealand urban 
network using microsimulation found that: 
• SCATS can be modified in anticipation of additional demand due to diversions 
resulting from an incident to reduce the delay to the diverted traffic 
• SCATS can be modified at the time of the incident in anticipation of the change in 
demand from an incident 
• although SCATS will respond to the change in demand caused by traffic diversions 
due to incidents, an immediate and targeted intervention will produce better results 
• the benefits of incident management interventions such as SCATS adjustment may be 
limited to particular journey paths. Microsimulation modelling can help to identify 
which routes efforts should be concentrated on. 
 
Both the literature review and the preliminary modelling highlighted the need for further 
research to be undertaken in this area in New Zealand. 
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6. Recommendations 
The following items are recommended for further investigation or action: 
• Further research should build on this study by expanding the modelling in terms of 
the incident scenarios tested and treatment options applied. 
• Consideration should be given to further expansion of the existing modelled network 
to include a wider range of alternative detour routes and to capture the impact of 
incidents over a wider network area. 
• Field data should be collected to investigate how motorists respond during incidents 
and to confirm the accuracy of the simulation model findings under incident 
conditions. Suitable data could include:  
- SCATS traffic count/occupancy and signal phasing data 
- CCTV images (queue lengths) 
- detector loop data (speed, occupancy) 
- floating-car or number-plate data (travel times) 
- survey of route choice during incidents, including drivers’ response to VMS and 
other information regarding incidents, 
• More widespread and robust means of incident detection should be considered in 
major New Zealand urban areas, on both motorway and arterial road networks. This 
includes more frequent mid-block detector loops (or alternative technology), 
expanded CCTV coverage and automated incident detection systems. 
• The impact of different response times to the overall performance and recovery of the 
network during and after an incident should be investigated further. 
• Further investigation is recommended into how drivers behave during incidents, 
particularly when provided with additional route information via VMS, radio reports, 
etc. 
• Further investigation should be made into the ability of SCATS and other software 
tools to detect incidents automatically and to provide suitable guidance on appropriate 
treatment strategies. If necessary, develop improved capability for the tools to do 
these tasks. 
• Investigation should be carried out into the ability of microsimulation to be linked 
directly to a live traffic situation, to enable ‘on-the-fly’ incident assessment, modelling 
and resolution. 
• Monitoring should continue of ITS literature and practice worldwide for any newer 
technologies or congestion management treatments that may emerge and be 
applicable to the New Zealand context. 
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8. Glossary 
Adaptive signals Traffic signals where the time allowed for each phase is 
dynamically determined from traffic conditions 
AID Automated incident detection 
Area-wide traffic 
control 
An automated system that attempts to coordinate all the 
signalised intersections over an area to optimise traffic flows 
and minimise delays 
ATIS Advanced traveller information systems 
ATMS Advanced traffic management systems 
ATTOMS Auckland Traffic and Transport Operation Monitoring Service: 
the Auckland traffic control centre 
Capacity The theoretical maximum sustainable volume of traffic that a 
particular road or intersection movement can accommodate 
CCTV Closed-circuit television: cameras that monitor traffic conditions 
with the video relayed to the traffic control centre 
Cycle time/length The time taken for a complete sequence of traffic signal phases 
to be run, before repeating 
Degree of saturation The ratio of the traffic demand (ie traffic volume or flow rate) to 
the theoretical capacity of the road or intersection 
Detector A sensing device (usually a loop of wire in the road) used to 
detect the presence of vehicles crossing or sitting at a location 
Fixed-time signals Traffic signals where the time allowed for each phase is held 
constant 
Fuse Software that links SCATS to S-Paramics 
ITS Intelligent transportation systems 
Microsimulation Traffic modelling whereby individual vehicles are simulated 
within the road network and driver decisions are made 
dynamically in response to conditions encountered throughout 
the network 
Movement A particular flow of traffic travelling from one intersection leg to 
another, or using certain traffic lanes 
NADICS National Driver Information and Control System (Scotland) 
NNCC National Network Control Centre, Scotland 
Occupancy The presence or otherwise of a vehicle at a particular location 
(usually at a detector), ie occupying that space 
Offset The difference in time between the same phasing point (usually 
the start of the green signal) in the operation of adjacent 
signalised intersections, often adjusted to provide 
synchronisation (or ‘coordination’) for vehicles travelling 
through both intersections 
Peak period The time of the day when traffic demand is at a maximum, eg 
morning and evening for commuter work trips. Other times are 
‘off-peak’ periods 
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Phasing A pre-set order of traffic signal phases and the time allocated to 
each one 
RTA Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales 
SCATS Sydney Coordinated Adaptive Traffic System, an adaptive 
control traffic system that adjusts signal timing, phasing, 
offsets and cycle length according to actual traffic conditions in 
real-time 
Signal phase A traffic signal state during which one or more vehicle 
movements receive right of way (ie green signal or arrow) 
S-Paramics Microsimulation software package developed by SIAS 
Stop-line A location right at an intersection where vehicles stop until they 
have right of way 
TMU Traffic Management Unit, Auckland 
Upstream A location prior to the current location, ie from where a vehicle 
has come. A location beyond the current location is 
‘downstream’ 
UTC Urban traffic control 
VMS Variable message signs 
 
